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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the foreign investment regime has been subject to an increas-
ing volume of criticism from the public. The significant sums of money at 
stake and the potential impact of the awards on State’s regulatory powers 
have placed the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (isDs) under the spotlight. 
In response to this, the European Union has proposed a far-reaching reform 
which introduces an Investment Court System (iCs). This model constitutes 
an innovative dispute settlement mechanism intended to address most of the 
core issues of the isDs by combining elements of the traditional isDs with 
judicial features. overall, this paper aims at analysing whether the EU’s 
new approach constitutes an effective improvement to the traditional isDs 
and the future of the international investment regime. To achieve this, the 
study begins with an overview of the current isDs; followed by a synopsis of 
the main criticisms to the traditional isDs; proceeded by a review of the core 
features of the EU’s proposed iCs and its inclusion in the new generation of 
iias in negotiation by the EU; and finally, provides a commentary of the main 
criticisms and obstacles that the introduction of the iCs is likely to encounter.
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Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Ceta), Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (ttip).
RESUMEn
En los últimos años, el régimen de inversión extranjera ha sido objeto de un 
creciente número de críticas del público. Las sumas significativas de dinero 
en juego y el posible impacto de los laudos en los poderes regulatorios del 
Estado han puesto al actual Sistema de Resolución de Controversias entre 
Inversores y el Estado bajo la lupa. En respuesta a ello, la Unión Europea 
ha propuesto una reforma de gran alcance mediante la introducción de un 
Sistema de Corte de Inversiones (sCi). El nuevo sistema constituye un me-
canismo innovador de resolución de controversias internacionales destinado 
a remediar los problemas centrales que acarrea el sistema actual, mediante la 
combinación de elementos tradicionales del arbitraje con rasgos judiciales. 
En este contexto, el presente escrito pretende analizar si el nuevo enfoque 
de la Unión Europea constituye una mejora efectiva del actual mecanismo 
de resolución de controversias de inversiones y del futuro del régimen de 
inversión internacional. Para dicho propósito, el artículo comienza con una 
descripción general del actual Sistema de Resolución de Controversias entre 
Inversores y el Estado; seguido de una sinopsis de sus principales críticas; 
continúa con un resumen de las principales características del Sistema de 
Corte de Inversiones, así como de su inclusión en la nueva generación de 
acuerdos internacionales de inversión en negociación por la Unión Europea; y, 
finalmente, hace una referencia a las principales críticas y posibles obstáculos 
que afrontará la introducción del nuevo Sistema de Corte de Inversiones.
PALABRAS CLAvE
Sistema de Corte de Inversiones, Sistema de Resolución de Controversias 
entre Inversores y el Estado, Inversión Extranjera Directa, Acuerdos Inter-
nacionales de Inversión, Acuerdo Económico y Comercial global (aeCG), 
Asociación Transatlántica de Comercio e Inversión.
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InTRoDUCTIon
Contemporary international investment agreements tend to articulate substan-
tive standards of protection that confer foreign investors the right to bring 
claims against sovereign States before international arbitral tribunals. This 
mechanism of dispute resolution is known as investor-state-dispute settle-
ment (isDs).
nevertheless, in recent years, the legitimacy of the isDs has been subject to 
numerous criticisms. In this context, critics seek for structural reforms to the 
system, while supporters of the status quo advocate for the need to maintain 
the core elements of the system with some amendments.
Some of the critiques to the isDs stem from tribunals rendering contra-
dictory decisions, the potential conflict of interest of individuals acting as 
counsellors and arbitrators in similar cases, and the apparent detriment of 
democratic institutions in favour of private interests. However, although 
previous attempts to reform have been dismissed as premature and politically 
challenging, recent developments within the European Union (EU) have 
gained momentum in favour of a major shift in the system, encouraged by 
the adoption of a permanent court system for the resolution of investment-
related disputes. 
Thus, the present study is based upon the EU’s proposal for the introduc-
tion of an Investment Court System (iCs), analysed both from an institutional 
and a procedural perspective. In this sense, the goal is to determine whether 
the implementation of the iCs – as proposed by the EU for the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip), already included in the EU-vietnam 
Free Trade Agreement and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (Ceta), and more recently in the EU-Singapore Investment 
Protection Agreement and the EU-Mexico Trade Agreement, and currently 
subject to bilateral negotiation in the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agree-
ment – constitutes an improvement to the current isDs.
For this purpose, the paper is divided into four complementary sections: 
first, (1) an overview of the current isDs; second, (2) a synopsis of the main 
criticisms to the traditional isDs; third, (3) an outline of the core features of 
the EU’s proposed Investment Court System; and, finally, (4) a reference 
to the main criticisms and obstacles that the introduction of the iCs is likely 
encounter.
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1. An ovERvIEw oF THE ISDS
1.1. The early years
The advent of the international investment regime constituted a significant 
improvement in terms of protection of foreign investment against governmental 
actions. Before its establishment, foreign investors willing to challenge ac-
tions or omissions in the country of their investment had to rely on unfamiliar 
national proceedings and often biased national courts. Alternatively, investors 
could resort to diplomatic protection from their home country, which at times 
was uncertain and problematic as it often entailed other political interests 
beyond the legal dispute.1
Following the culmination of world war ii, capital exporting countries 
began incorporating standards of protection for foreign investors against non-
commercial risks such as expropriation and other forms of discrimination in 
international treaties. These protective legal grounds operated as safeguards 
to mitigate the risks of investing in countries with high level of corruption, 
systems of political patronage and weak institutions.2
Initially, these rights were included in general trade treaties such as the 
“friendship, commerce and navigation” treaties promoted by the United 
States. However, by the late 1950s, some European countries like germany, 
France, Switzerland and the netherlands began concluding treaties exclusively 
orientated towards investment, a practice later followed by the US.3 These 
investment-focused treaties regularly involved two countries and became 
known as Bilateral Investment Treaties (Bits). 
By the late 1980s, the need from developing countries to attract Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDi) to incentivise the development of infrastructures 
and services and optimise State businesses, presented an open invitation to 
capital exporting countries and contributed to the promulgation of Bits. In this 
sense, the agreement was clear: in return of FDi, host States would agree for 
arbitration to be the dispute settlement mechanism in investment disputes.4 
Accordingly, the vast majority of Bits entered into force in the early 1990s 
and, as a result, the late 1990s and early 2000s experienced an investor-
1  koeth, w. Can the Investment Court System (ics) save ttip and ceta. European Institute 
of Public Administration (eipa) working Papers, 2016. Available at: http://publications.eipa.eu/
en/details/&tid=1860 (Accessed 16 August 2017), 3.
2  WeBB yaCkee, J. Toward a Minimalist System of International Investment Law. Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review. vol. 303, 2009, 305-306.
3  Ibid., p. 306.
4  stone sWeet, A., ChUnG, M. and saltzMan, A. Arbitral Lawmaking and State Power: 
An Empirical Analysis of Investment Arbitration. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919723 
(Accessed 17 July 2017), 3.
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state arbitration boom and the exponential development of investment law 
throughout the globe.5 
1.2. The foreign investment regime
There are currently over 3000 international investment agreements (iias) in 
force, from which Bits are the primary source of international legal protection 
for foreign investors. This broad category of iias is complemented by Free 
Trade Agreements (Ftas), such as the north American Free Trade Agreement 
(naFta) and the Energy Charter Treaty (eCt), which contain investment chapters 
articulating substantive standards and international arbitration as the dispu-
te settlement mechanism.6 Furthermore, following the trend of investment 
promotion, States have also adopted national legislation offering arbitration 
for the settlement of foreign investment disputes. 
Although there are differences in scope and terminology between the 
numerous iias, the majority of modern investment treaties share common 
features. First, they adopt substantive standards for the protection of FDi, 
including: the prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation without fully, 
adequate and prompt compensation; principles of non-discrimination from 
domestic investors (‘national treatment’) and from third countries investors 
(‘most-favoured nation treatment’); the right to be treated in accordance 
with customary international law (‘minimum standard of treatment’); the 
right to receive diligent protection from physical assaults to personnel and 
facilities (‘Full Protection and Security’); and a wide range of guarantees 
including due process and respect of investor’s legitimate expectations from 
given undertakings as well as a stable legal framework (‘fair and equitable 
treatment’).7 Second, they confer investors the opportunity to bring claims 
for the violation of these standards against host States before arbitral tribu-
nals.8 Third, they provide for compensation in the form of monetary awards 
instead of the reversal of laws or administrative decisions.9 
These treaties adopt mixed arbitration as the mechanism to resolve 
investment-related claims, commonly known as Investor-to-State Dispute 
Settlement (isDs). Essentially, isDs allows foreign investors to initiate legal 
proceedings against a sovereign State when the latter has allegedly breached 
its commitments under an iia. These cases are adjudicated by an arbitral panel 
5  WeBB yaCkee. Toward a Minimalist System of International Investment Law, cit., 307.
6  Ibid., p. 309.
7  Ibid., p. 307.
8  stone sWeet, ChUnG and saltzMan. Arbitral Lawmaking and State Power: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Investment Arbitration, cit., 3.
9  Collins, D. A. The UK should include Investor State Dispute Settlement (isds) in its 
Post-Brexit International Investment Agreements. 2017, 3. ssrn Electronic Journal: https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2924051
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composed of experts selected by common accord by the conflicting parties 
on an ad hoc basis.10
1.3. Rules and institutions
isDs may take place before different institutions and can be governed by a 
variety of arbitral rules by reference to the applicable iia. Typically, isDs is 
offered in conjunction with a choice of forum between the International Cen-
tre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (iCsiD) and the United nations 
Commission for International Trade Law Rules (UnCitral) administered by 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (pCa) or an ad hoc tribunal. Addition-
ally, it can be managed by other arbitral house operating under its own rules, 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce (iCC), the London Court of 
International Arbitration (lCia), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (sCC), 
and the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce (siCC), among others. 
Furthermore, international treaties governing the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards such as the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (new York Convention of 1958) and 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
nationals of other States (iCsiD or washington Convention of 1965), have 
ensured that the awards rendered by the arbitral tribunals are enforceable 
against host States and difficult to challenge in their domestic courts.11 Under 
the new York Convention, which currently lists 159 States parties,12 an award 
issued in a Contracting State can be freely enforced in any other Contract-
ing State, limited to specific grounds for challenge through local courts. on 
the other hand, under the washington Convention, which currently lists 153 
State parties13, an award is automatically enforceable in an iCsiD State, only 
subject to an annulment proceeding set out within the Convention.
In practice, iCsiD is by far the most referred arbitral forum for investment 
disputes.14 Tailored to promote the settlement of investment disputes,15 it was 
established by the iCsiD Convention in 1965 as a delocalised facility under the 
auspices of the world Bank.16 In this sense, iCsiD is an institutional framework 
that facilitates the conduct of arbitration but does not provide substantive law, 
10  koeth. Can the Investment Court System (ics) Save ttip and ceta, cit., 3.
11  WeBB yaCkee. Toward a Minimalist System of International Investment Law, cit., 307.
12  See the full list of Contracting States in: http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries 
(Accessed 25 June 2018). 
13  See the full list of Contracting States in: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/
Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Accessed 25 June 2018). 
14  Arbitral Rules - Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator (Investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org, 2017). Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/isDs/FilterByRulesAndInstitution 
(Accessed 20 September 2017).
15  Preamble to the iCsiD Convention.
16  Article 2 of the iCsiD Convention.
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a role that is left to the parties by reference to the iia applicable to the dispute. 
Additionally, the iCsiD framework is regulatory self-contained, operating by 
exclusive reference to the Convention and Rules.17 
Another distinctive feature of the iCsiD framework is that, according to 
Article 54 of the iCsiD Convention, domestic courts of member States are 
required to recognise iCsiD awards in the same way they would implement a 
judgment from their own highest Court. This is particularly relevant consider-
ing that the Convention is currently ratified by most States in the world and 
that it operates as an Administrative structure of the world Bank.
Regarding disputes falling outside of the scope of the iCsiD Convention, 
parties may resort to iCsiD Additional Facility, created in 1978 and reviewed 
in 2006. In such cases, disputes are administered by the Secretariat of the 
Centre and may benefit from its institutional support and expertise, although 
the recognition and enforcement of the awards in such cases would be gov-
erned by the new York Convention.18
on the other hand, there are a number of non-iCsiD arbitral institutions 
available to administer the settlement of investment disputes, such as the 
above-mentioned iCC, lCia, sCC and siCC, which operate under their own 
arbitral rules or by reference to the UnCitral Rules. In such cases, having 
a seat of arbitration, these arbitral houses maintain a strong connection to 
the country in which the institution is based, whereby the proceedings are 
influenced by the legislation in place and the enforceability of the awards is 
governed by the new York Convention.19
1.4. Main features of the isds 
The popularity of the isDs can be attributed to three distinctive features that 
have made the system particularly convenient for the resolution of investment-
related disputes with a cross-border component.
First, the implementation of investor-State arbitration. noteworthy, 
arbitration is a flexible and pragmatic procedure that facilitates parties’ 
autonomy. In this sense, parties are free to select the Rules applicable to the 
controversy, the arbitrators hearing their case, the institution that is going to 
supervise the proceedings and the language in which the proceedings are to 
be conducted in. Consequently, arbitration aims at ensuring impartiality in 
17  Process Overview (Icsid.worldbank.org, 2017). Available at: https://icsid.worldbank.
org/en/Pages/process/overview.aspx (Accessed 6 July 2017).
18  icsid Additional Facility Rules (Icsid.worldbank.org, 2017). Available at: https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/iCsiD-Additional-Facility-Rules.aspx (Accessed 4 July 2017).
19  BUtler, n. Possible Improvements to The Framework of International Investment 
Arbitration. The Journal of World Investment & Trade. vol. 14, 2013, 632.
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the decision-making, offering the parties equal opportunities in defending 
their legal causes and providing binding decisions.20 
Second, the finality of the awards. This feature implies that the losing 
party has limited rights to challenge the award, enabling disputes to be solved 
in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Accordingly, iCsiD provides for 
annulment proceedings rather than appeals, the difference being that “[a]
nnulment of a decision simply amounts to nullification, usually due to some 
kind of abuse of process. Appeal, on the other hand, involves evaluating the 
substantive correctness of the decision, and may result in the replacement 
of the original decision with a new one”.21 In this sense, Article 52 of the 
iCsiD Convention provides five limited grounds for annulment, whereas in 
non-iCsiD cases, awards may be challenged restrictively under Article 5 of 
the new York Convention.
Third, enforceability of awards. By virtue of the washington Conven-
tion, awards are automatically enforceable in all Member States of the iCsiD 
Convention. on the other hand, under the new York Convention, awards 
are enforceable unless they contravene national law and public policies. 
Consequently, arbitral awards are easier to enforce internationally in com-
parison to judgments of national courts, as the latter are limited to reciprocal 
enforcement arrangements.22 
2. CRITICISM To THE ISDS
 
In recent years, the foreign investment regime has been subject to an increasing 
volume of criticism from host States and the public. The significant sums of 
money at stake and the potential impact of the awards on State’s regulatory 
powers have placed the isDs under the spotlight.
The criticism to the isDs can be summarised in three structural categories: 
1) the lack of consistency in the decisions; 2) the lack of impartiality of the 
arbitrators; and 3) the lack of transparency of the proceedings, which will 
be analysed with more detail below. 
20  Collins. The UK should include Investor State Dispute Settlement (isds) in its Post-
Brexit International Investment Agreements, cit., 4.
21  BUtler. Possible Improvements to the Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 631.
22  Collins. The UK should include Investor State Dispute Settlement (isds) in its Post-
Brexit International Investment Agreements, cit., 5.
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2.1. Lack of consistency
2.1.1. Examples of inconsistency
The problem of inconsistency derives from tribunals rendering contradictory 
decisions in cases involving similar sets of facts, parties and applicable iias. 
A notable example of inconsistency is found in the Lauder cases,23 in 
which different UnCitral tribunals dealing with the same factual background, 
almost identical Claimants, and similar applicable standards of protection, 
with the only difference being that the proceedings were brought under dif-
ferent treaties, reached dramatically opposite decisions. The first arbitration 
was initiated by Mr Lauder, the controlling shareholder of CMe, as an Ameri-
can investor under the US-Czech Bit. The second was brought by CMe, as a 
company registered in the netherlands by reference to the Dutch-Czech Bit. 
while the London-based Tribunal dismissed the expropriation claims, the 
Stockholm Tribunal found that the Czech Republic had committed expropria-
tion, awarding $355 million in damages. Regardless of the arguable ‘correct’ 
decision, it is clear that the contradictory results evidenced the structural 
shortcomings of the system.24 
Another example of inconsistency is found in the sGs cases,25 in which 
different iCsiD Tribunals interpreted aversely the content of the ‘umbrella 
clause’, applicable to similar facts, although articulated in different treaties, 
i.e. the Switzerland-Pakistan Bit and Switzerland-Philippines Bit. while the 
sGs-Pakistan Tribunal adopted a restrictive interpretation,26 the sGs-Philippines 
Tribunal implemented an extensive interpretation.27 Since in these cases the 
applicable umbrella clauses were different versions contained in separate 
Bits, “the tribunal’s contradictory approaches, on a conceptual level, are not 
as problematic as the two Lauder cases. But given the number of umbrella 
clauses within modern Bits, the practical consequences of the decisions are 
23  cme Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Ad hoc - UnCitral Arbitration Rules, Partial 
Award of 13 September 2001, Final Award of 14 March 2003; and Lauder v. Czech Republic, 
Final Award, 3 September 2001, Ad hoc - UnCitral Arbitration Rules.
24  lairD, I. and askeW, R. Finality versus Consistency: Does Investor State Arbitration 
Need an Appellate System? The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. vol. 7, 2005, 299.
25  See sGs Société générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan. iCsiD 
Case no. arB/01/13 (2003), Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003; and sGs Société générale 
de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines. iCsiD Case no. arB/02/6 (2004), Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004.
26  In sGs-Pakistan the Tribunal stressed the need of “clear and convincing evidence” that 
the State parties to the Bit intended to transform contract breaches into treaty claims, in order to 
prevent every breach of contract to become automatically actionable before iCsiD Tribunals.
27  In sGs-Philippines the Tribunal empathised in the lack of limitations in the wording of 
the umbrella clause and thus States “shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to 
specific investments in its territory by investors of the other”.
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considerable”.28 Ultimately, the sGs awards left States and investors with-
out a clear understanding of the meaning and scope of the umbrella clause, 
contributing to a sense of uncertainty and unpredictability in the resolution 
of future disputes.29 
other examples of inconsistency are represented by a number of deci-
sions such as Metalclad v. Mexico30 and S.D. Myers v. Canada,31 in which 
the respective Tribunals interpreted differently the standard of ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ (Fet) contained in the same treaty, i.e. Article 1105 of 
naFta. while the Metalclad tribunal interpreted Fet as an independent standard 
of protection, beyond the minimum standard of treatment under customary 
international law; the S.D. Myers tribunal levelled the standard as an ele-
ment of the general rules of international law. Again, irrespectively of the 
correct approach to Fet, the fact that Tribunals were not uniformly dealing 
with the meaning of Fet under the same treaty implied unpredictability for 
the forthcoming disputes.32
2.1.2. The need for an appellate body 
Experts believe that the ‘crisis of consistency’ in international investment 
arbitration could be addressed by introducing an appellate body. They believe 
that such instance would solve many of the current issues associated with 
inconsistency, including: a lack of predictability of the law, an absence of 
coherence within the field and the non-existence of the possibility of cor-
rectness in decision-making.33 
The first issue to be addressed is the lack of predictability. Predictability 
derives from consistency, being the former a fundamental touchstone of any 
given legal system.34 Furthermore, the present lack of an appellate body to 
review the merits in cases of inconsistent decisions increases the sense of 
unpredictability, as there is no certain binding interpretation of reference. In 
this sense, critics have argued that “[t]he mantra of one case not being binding 
on any other, each one being an individual, one-off, ad-hoc process, has no 
place in a legal system that passes judgment on a vast range of government 
28  taMs, C. J. Is there a Need for an icsid Appellate Structure? 2009, 235. ssrn Electronic 
Journal: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1341268
29  Ibid.
30  Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (2000). iCsiD Case no. arB(AF)/97/1 
(2000).
31  S.D. Myers v. Canada (2000) ilM 1408 (naFta Arbitration).
32  Ibid.
33  BUtler. Possible Improvements to the Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 632.
34  Mann, H. et al. Comments on icsid Discussion Paper, “Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for icsid Arbitration”. International Institute for Sustainable Development (iisD), 
2004, 6.
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measures affecting international investments”.35 Consequently, a review-tier 
body is envisaged to play a key role in consolidating predictable decisions.
The second issue refers to an absence of coherence in the practice of isDs. 
This matter derives from the existence of a number of institutions and ad hoc 
tribunals settling investment-related disputes independently, without recourse 
to a single hierarchical authority with the capacity to unify approaches and 
interpretations.36 Accordingly, there is currently no space left for systematic 
interpretations that integrate the different treaties in place.37
This situation is exacerbated by the current co-governance of multiple 
investment treaties and the ambiguous combination of customary interna-
tional law and treaty law. In this sense, this fragmentation has promulgated 
differing tribunal interpretations and thus, prevented consistency.38 Accord-
ingly, commentators have argued that “it would be beneficial to abandon the 
chaotic system of investment regulation, and strive towards the creation of 
a single, global overarching investment treaty”.39
Therefore, some of the compelling reasons that support the need for an 
appellate facility stem from the following circumstances which, although 
valid, may hinder coherence: tribunals being limited to a formal duty to apply 
substantive law to a given applicable treaty; arbitrators coming from various 
backgrounds, specialities and preferences; and arbitrators being formally 
independent in every case.40
The third issue, which is one of the most recurrent criticisms to the isDs, 
is the lack of a corrective instance available through appeal. Hence, some 
critics have favoured a two-tier body that could promote correctness, thus 
guaranteeing accurate decisions in case of faulty awards. In this sense “[t]he 
investment appellate body could focus on the issues that divide the parties, and 
it would have the benefit of having before it one fully-reasoned decision”.41
In sum, according to the critics, the introduction of an appellate mecha-
nism would enable a greater level of consistency and coherence in the 
decision-making, which in turn would enhance predictability. Moreover, 
the introduction of a two-tier structure would prevent abuses to the system, 
35  Ibid.
36  BUtler. Possible Improvements to the Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 613.
37  stone sWeet, ChUnG and saltzMan. Arbitral Lawmaking and State Power: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Investment Arbitration, cit., 7-8.
38  taMs. Is there a Need for an icsid Appellate Structure?, cit., 236.
39  BUtler. Possible Improvements to the Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 625-626.
40  stone sWeet, ChUnG and saltzMan. Arbitral Lawmaking and State Power: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Investment Arbitration, cit., 7-8.
41  taMs. Is there a Need for an icsid Appellate Structure?, cit., 240.
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such as forum shopping, by eliminating the option of looking for a “more 
convenient” interpretation of investment law.42 
nevertheless, experts have delimited two requirements to effectively 
develop an appellate body. First, it must be established as a single compre-
hensive appeal facility competent enough to hear appeals from all investment 
disputes, as multiple appellate bodies functioning in parallel would likely 
increase inconsistency. Second, it must be organised as a standing perma-
nent body composed of a small number of arbitrators, as this would allow 
personal and institutional continuity to consolidate interpretations and legal 
developments.43
The fact that certain sectors within trade disputes have successfully ad-
opted appeal options is a strong indicator of the potential benefits of such 
approach. In this way, the introduction in 1995 of an appellate body within 
the world Trade organisation (Wto) framework, provided a hallmark in 
reaching consistent decisions on world trade law. In doing so, it has proven 
that “the appeals processes need not invite: (1) undue delays to the dispute 
resolution process, (2) increased costs for parties, or (3) an unmanageable 
caseload for the institution”.44 Arguably, this example demystifies some of 
the alleged disadvantages and shows that the mechanism may offer efficient 
and cost-effective results.
2.2. Lack of impartiality
The traditional isDs, inspired by the principle of party autonomy, promotes the 
selection of arbitrators by the contesting parties on an ad hoc basis. Conse-
quently, the systematic issue with impartiality does not derive from the first 
designation of an arbitrator, instead, it stems from subsequent appointments 
and cases in which an arbitrator has previously defended investors’ claims 
concerning similar legal issues.
In this way, the lack of impartiality is addressed by referring to the con-
flict of interest of individuals acting as counsellors and arbitrators in similar 
cases – building a sort of “international elite of arbitration” – together with 
the marked interest of arbitrators to be reappointed in future cases.
42  BUtler. Possible Improvements to the Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 634.
43  taMs. Is there a Need for an icsid Appellate Structure?, cit., 237-239.
44  Gleason, E. E. International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid Of? Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal. vol. 7, 2007, 273-275. Available at: http://digitalcommons.
pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss2/5 (Accessed 17 July 2017).
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2.2.1. Double-hat dilemma
The first issue, known as “double-hat dilemma”, refers to the concern regard-
ing individuals acting both as counsellors and arbitrators in cases with similar 
legal issues, and to the absence of an ethical code of practice for professionals 
in the field.45 In other words, there are no safeguards preventing inappropriate 
incentives that may flourish from the uncontrolled mixture of roles. 
In this sense, commentators argue that the successive alternation of roles 
by professionals – acting indistinctively as arbitrators, counsellors, govern-
ment representatives and expert witnesses – may jeopardise the delivery of 
impartial and independent justice. Consequently, in line with the 2014 UnCtaD 
Trade and Development Report, critics demand clear rules delimiting the 
different roles to avoid the risk of impartiality.46
Thus, the sense of impartiality resulting from the “double-hat dilemma” 
can be exemplified by the recurrent challenges to Yves Fortier by venezuela.47 
Regardless of the Tribunal’s decision on the challenges, the situation brings 
to light the difficulties – real or apparent – that the current alternation of roles 
represents. In essence, among other allegations, venezuela was unsatisfied 
with having an arbitrator that had recently departed from one of the law firms 
that had been consistently opposing to venezuela before different forums.
 
2.2.2. Reappointment
The second issue is the alleged interest of arbitrators to be reappointed to 
subsequent arbitrations. In this sense, critics fear that arbitrators may be 
carrying hidden financial incentives to promote the proliferation of cases. 
In other words, by promoting investors’ access to arbitrations, they may be 
enabling the growth of the industry and thus, the prospects of future reap-
pointments for themselves.48 
Additionally, it has also been argued that, as arbitrators are appointed by the 
parties, there could be a risk of them feeling implicitly bound to represent the 
interests of the appointing party, affecting the impartiality of their decision-
making. Therefore, for some experts “the ad hoc nature of their appointment 
45  horVath, g. J. and Berzero, R. Arbitrator and Counsel: The Double-Hat Dilemma. 
Transnational Dispute Management (tdm). 2017. Available at: https://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1985 (Accessed 19 August 2017).
46  UnCtaD. Trade and Development Report. United nations, 2014. Available at: http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf (Accessed 8 July 2017).
47  For instance, see Fábrica de Vidrios Los Andes, CA y otros v. Venezuela. iCsiD Case 
no. arB/12/21.
48  Van harten, g. Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part Two): An 
Examination of Hypotheses of Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 
vol. 50, 2012.
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is perceived by the public as interfering in their ability to act independently 
and to properly balance investment protection against the right to regulate”.49
An example of perceived impartiality due to recurrent reappointments can 
be considered from venezuela’s appointment of Professor Brigitte Stern as 
arbitrator in seven different arbitration proceedings. Again, regardless of the 
results of the challenges, such circumstances raise concerns about the number 
of occasions an arbitrator could be appointed before it becomes suspicious.
Also, it has been pointed out that the rules of disclosure to prevent arbitra-
tor impartiality are insufficient guarantees when settling sensible public and 
private interests in dispute. Therefore, critics advocate for “the need to move 
to a system that reflects the same judicial distance from the practice of law 
required of domestic judges making rulings on these matters”.50 
2.3. Lack of transparency
Critics have agreed on the lack of transparency present in the traditional isDs. 
This problem is believed to stem from the fact that investment arbitration 
developed from commercial arbitration, where confidentiality is a guiding 
principle and one of its distinctive features. 
2.3.1. Public process
For those opposing isDs, it is shocking that, besides the isDs, there is “[n]o 
other legal dispute settlement system under public international law […] [that] 
either prevents the publication of its determinations or relies in whole or in 
part on the publication of selected portions of a decision”.51 Consequently, 
there is an active demand for the adoption of complete, expedient and easily 
accessible publications of decisions and instances during the proceedings. 
nevertheless, the existence of a current trend aiming for transparency in 
international arbitration is undeniable given the public interests at stake. In 
this way, although most of the new iias have adopted the full publication in 
web-accessible versions of all documents and decisions, some treaties and 
institutions reluctant to transparency can still be found.52
Furthermore, some experts insist on the benefits of confidentiality, by 
arguing that it allows parties to discuss openly amongst themselves in the 
search of solutions to their disputes, something that may be more difficult 
to achieve under the public eye. Yet, transparency could be maintained as 
49  MalMströM, C. Concept Paper: Investment in ttip And Beyond – The Path for Reform. 
European Commission, 2015, 6.
50  Mann et al. Comments on icsid Discussion Paper, “Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for icsid Arbitration”, cit., 11.
51  Ibid., 8.
52  Ibid.
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the general rule, allowing confidentiality only in exceptional circumstances, 
when deemed appropriate by the tribunal for the private discussion of sensi-
tive information.53 
2.3.2. Amicus briefs
Another important matter in the search for greater transparency relates to the 
implementation of a system of amicus briefs in investment arbitration. For 
supporters of this measure, contributions from a third party may assist the 
tribunal by bringing forward different arguments and sides to the controversy, 
helping avoid the current secrecy of the system.
Furthermore, this mechanism may contribute to transparency by exercis-
ing indirect public control whilst assessing the level of public accessibility 
to the cases. This way, transparency would become a pre-requisite for the 
amicus process, which would then be possible only in the case of people 
being aware of the disputes.54 
overall, through the given examples, detractors of isDs have exposed 
the potential harming effects that arbitration entails to host States and their 
citizens, and the significant implicit sacrifices and risks when attracting 
foreign investment.
3. THE InTRoDUCTIon oF THE ICS
The criticism against the traditional isDs encouraged the iCsiD Secretariat to 
release, on 22 october 2004, the discussion paper “Possible Improvements 
of the Framework for iCsiD Arbitration” for public comments, which con-
templated, amongst other reforms, the creation of an appeal facility within 
the iCsiD framework.55 
nevertheless, this idea was strongly opposed by the majority of iCsiD 
members and, consequently, discarded – at least provisionally – by the iCsiD 
Secretariat. This was supported by the publication, on 12 May 2005, of the 
working paper “Suggested Changes to the iCsiD Rules and Regulations”, in 
which, although acknowledging the need to further develop the proposed 
appellate mechanism, the iCsiD Secretariat concluded that “it would be 
premature to attempt to establish such an iCsiD mechanism at this stage, 
particularly in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised in the 
Discussion Paper”.56 
53  Ibid., 10.
54  Ibid., 9.
55  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Possible Improvements of 
the Framework for icsid Arbitration. iCsiD Secretariat, 2004.
56  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Suggested Changes to The 
icsid Rules and Regulations. iCsiD Secretariat, 2005, par. 4.
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nowadays, more than a decade after the first attempt to reform, censures 
to the traditional isDs continue to emerge and have become more notorious 
in the case law. In contrast, the need for amendments is no longer premature, 
opening the door for a second attempt to reform, this time promoted under 
the auspices of the European Union, today´s largest provider and destination 
of FDi in the global economy.57
In this sense, the EU “has seized the opportunity to reform the traditional 
arbitration-based system and replace it with a permanent court system”.58 
This constitutes an innovative mechanism intended to address some of the 
core issues discussed in the previous chapter, by combining elements of the 
traditional isDs with judicial features.
Hence, this chapter deals with the inclusion of the EU’s new investment 
policy in ongoing iias negotiations, the core institutional features of the iCs, 
and the prospect of a future Multilateral Investment Court for the application 
of the new approach across the globe.
3.1. The EU’s new investment policy
In 2009, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Member States of 
the European Union added “foreign direct investment” to the terms of article 
207(1) of the tFeU and, consequently, gave the competence to the EU – as a 
unit – for negotiating and concluding agreements protecting foreign direct 
investments in all sectors. 
This arrangement constituted a significant transformation in the EU’s 
investment policy in many ways. First, it implied the end of the traditional 
practice of the EU Member States of concluding investment agreements with 
third States on an individual basis. Second, it set the ground for the adoption 
of a single and comprehensive approach to the foreign investment regime. 
Third, it guaranteed public scrutiny over any future trade agreement in Europe 
by adopting a right of veto of the European Parliament.59 
This new political framework presented an ideal platform for the EU to 
promote an unprecedented shift in its forthcoming foreign investment policy 
and thus, in shaping the future of the foreign investment regime. Under these 
circumstances, the EU’s new investment policy aims at a more consistent, 
impartial and transparent system, achievable in its view by the introduction of 
57  See: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/index_en.htm 
(Accessed 19 May 2018).
58  lenk, H. An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Invest-
ment Agreements: A Discussion of the Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam and the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada. European Papers. vol. 1, 2016, 665. Available 
at: http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/europeanforum/investment-court-system-new-generation-
eu-trade-and-investment-agreements (Accessed 16 July 2017).
59  koeth. Can the Investment Court System (ics) Save ttip and ceta, cit., 6.
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an Investment Court System for the resolution of investment-related disputes, 
which merges features of arbitration and judicial settlement. 
To this date, the iCs has been already included in most recent Ftas entered 
into by the EU, while suggested in others currently in negotiation. Accordingly, 
in September 2015, the European Commission’s draft text of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip), which was complemented in november 
2015, constituted the first iia to include the iCs as the mechanism of dispute 
settlement. Subsequently, in January 2016, the iCs was implemented in the 
EU-vietnam Fta, followed by the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (Ceta) in February 2016.60 More recently, in April 2018, the 
iCs has been incorporated in both the EU-Singapore Investment Protection 
Agreement and the EU-Mexico Trade Agreement, while negotiations are be-
ing hold for its inclusion in the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.
3.1.1. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip)
In March 2014, the European Commission launched an online public consul-
tation on investment protection and isDs in the ttip, followed by a report with 
the results, published in January 2015, in which the Commission revealed 
an overwhelming public discontent with the arbitral tribunals conducted 
under the isDs.61 
In response to this, in May 2015, the Commission, led by its Trade Commis-
sioner, Cecilia Malmoström, who had previously criticised the isDs model by 
referring to the need of establishing “the rule of law, not the rule of lawyers” 
,62 issued a concept paper entitled “Investment in ttip and beyond – the path 
for reform”, which inaugurated the possibility of introducing a permanent 
international investment court system for the resolution of investment-related 
disputes in the ttip.63 
Following this, in September 2015, the Commission revealed an infor-
mal draft text for the ttip including the introduction of the iCs, which was 
then transferred to the formal proposal made public in november 2015 for 
negotiation with the United States. In the event of approval, considering the 
investment network of the two parties, it would certainly shape the future of 
60  reinisCh, A. Will the EU’s Proposal concerning an Investment Court System for ceta 
and ttip lead to Enforceable Awards? - The Limits of Modifying the icsid Convention and the 
Nature of Investment Arbitration. Journal of International Economic Law. vol. 19, 2016, 761-
762.
61  Report Presented Today: Consultation on Investment Protection In EU-US Trade Talks 
- Trade - European Commission (Trade.ec.europa.eu, 2017). Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1234 (Accessed 6 July 2017).
62  European Commission. Discussion on Investment in ttip at the Meeting of the Interna-
tional Trade Committee of the European Parliament. 2015. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_speeCh-15-4624_en.htm (Accessed 10 July 2017).
63  MalMströM. Concept Paper: Investment in ttip And Beyond – The Path for Reform, cit.
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investment dispute settlement. nonetheless, negotiations were halted in late 
2016 amid strong opposition from various sectors, although representatives 
of both parties have expressed willingness to resume bilateral talks.
3.1.2. The EU-vietnam Free Trade Agreement
As stated above, the Commission’s proposal to substitute the traditional isDs 
with the iCs was not limited to the ttip but intended to encompass all future 
EU trade agreement. Accordingly, in December 2015, the Commission an-
nounced, through a press release, that negotiations on the EU-vietnam Fta 
had concluded, and that States parties had agreed on including the iCs as the 
mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes.64
Although this announcement constituted a significant confirmation of the 
new roadmap drawn by the EU’s investment policy, it received little attention 
from the public outside the investment law community.65
3.1.3. The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic  
and Trade Agreement (Ceta)
Furthermore, in February 2016, the Commission announced through a press 
release66 that Ceta’s negotiating parties had decided to revise the previously 
agreed version of the treaty, in order to replace the originally conceived isDs 
with the iCs, following the outline provided for the ttip formal proposal and 
recent integration in the final text of the EU-vietnam Fta. 
In regard to Ceta’s first version, which had conceived the isDs, it was con-
sidered as the cutting-edge development of investment protection “contain-
ing all possible safeguards against an abuse of the system by profit-seeking 
corporations at the expense of citizens and governments”.67 In particular, it 
included clear definitions of key concepts such as ‘indirect expropriation’ and 
‘Fet’, as well as a far-reaching preamble balancing the protection of investor’s 
rights with the promotion of sustainable development, labour, environmental 
and human rights protection, and an express exception endorsing the States’ 
regulatory power on matters of public health, the environment, public order 
and morality. nevertheless, the first version failed to address one of the most 
criticised aspects of the system, namely the isDs, perceived by the public as 
64  European Commission. The EU and Vietnam Finalise Landmark Trade Deal. 2017. 
Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409 (Accessed 9 July 2017).
65  lenk. An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Investment 
Agreements, cit., 666.
66  European Commission. ceta: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on Investment 
in Trade Agreement. 2016. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-399_en.htm 
(Accessed 12 July 2017).
67  koeth. Can the Investment Court System (ics) save ttip and ceta, cit., 8.
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a mechanism which allegedly allowed private parties to force States to pay 
vast sums of money at the expense of public resources.68 
Under these circumstances, the adoption of the 2016 revised version of 
Ceta constituted a response to the critiques by introducing a major shift in 
investment dispute settlement in the form of a comprehensive agreement 
with Canada, a culturally alike partner of the EU. This revised version is also 
expected to be adopted with the US, and thus cover a significant amount of 
world trade relations and develop into the default standard for any future 
investment agreement worldwide.69
given that Ceta was approved by the European Parliament and has be-
come the first iia adopting the iCs entering into force, it has established the 
yardstick – for both critics and supporters – of the EU’s new approach in 
investment policy. 
notably, the Regional Parliament of wallonia (Belgium), which has a 
veto over Belgium’s consent to trade agreements, objected to the signature of 
Ceta, demanding stronger safeguards on labour, environmental and consumer 
standards and criticising the investment chapter.70 Although Belgium finally 
provided its consent, this was conditioned to requesting an opinion from the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (eCJ) concerning the compatibility of 
the proposed investment court system with EU law, which Belgium submit-
ted on 6 September 2017.71 Though Ceta provisionally entered into force on 
21 September 2017, its ratification in Belgium is conditioned to a positive 
answer from the eCJ. In this context, some commentators consider that a nega-
tive answer from the eCJ may not only exclude the investment chapter but 
hinder the institution of a multilateral investment court system in Europe.72 
3.1.4. The EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement
on 18 April 2018, after eight years of bilateral talks, the European Com-
mission made public the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (Fta) and 
an Investment Protection Agreement (Bit) between the EU and Singapore. 
The EU-Singapore Bit represents an important benchmark towards setting 
investment protection standards for the Southeast Asian region, while opening 
the door for a region-to-region agreement between the EU and the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian nations (asean), to which Singapore is a member 
68  Ibid.
69  Ibid.
70  See: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37749236 (Accessed 19 July 2017).
71  See: https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/2017/minister_reynders_sub-
mits_request_opinion_ceta (Accessed 8 September 2017).
72  See: http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/update-on-the-european-commissions-
drive-for-investment-courts/ (Accessed 12 January 2018).
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State.73 overall, the agreement contains all aspects of the EU’s new approach 
to investment protection and its enforcement mechanisms, including: (i) a 
Permanent Investment Tribunal of First Instance to hear investment claims, 
whose members will be appointed in advance by the EU and Singapore, 
subject to rigorous rules of independence and directed by a binding code of 
conduct included in the agreement;74 and (ii) a Permanent Appeal Tribunal to 
hear appeals from provisional awards issued by the First Instance Tribunal.75
Moreover, the agreement paves the way to the establishment of a mul-
tilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of 
international investment disputes with other trading partners, subordinating 
its dispute settlement provisions to those agreed in a future multilateral 
mechanism.76 
3.1.5. The EU-Mexico Trade Agreement
Shortly after, on 21 April 2018, the EU announced the conclusion of a new 
EU-Mexico Trade Agreement, intended to deepen and broaden the existing 
network of trade and investment between the parties. 
Likewise, this agreement implements the EU’s new approach to invest-
ment protection and dispute resolution by replacing the traditional isDs 
system with the new iCs.77 In this way, the inclusion of the iCs in yet another 
trade agreement reinforces the EU’s attempt to ‘modernise’ the framework 
of investment protection by introducing more judicial-alike features to hear 
such disputes, while advancing towards an ultimately envisaged Multilateral 
Investment Court System. 
3.2. The core institutional features of the ics
From an institutional perspective, the iCs implemented significant changes 
to the traditional isDs. First, by establishing a first instance permanent tri-
bunal with publicly appointed members, as opposed to the traditional panel 
of arbitrators selected by the parties. Second, by introducing an appellate 
tribunal, as opposed to the limited grounds provided for the challenge of 
73  European Commission, Memorandum: ‘Key Elements of the EU-Singapore Trade 
and Investment Agreements’. 2018. Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=1827 (Accessed 8 July 2018).
74  Article 3.9, EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement.
75  Article 3.10, EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement.
76  Article 3.12, EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement.
77  European Commission. Memorandum: ‘Key features of the EU-Mexico trade agree-
ment’. 2018. Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1831 (Accessed 
8 July 2018). 
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awards before the Annulment Committee under iCsiD framework or the set-
ting aside procedure before national courts in non-iCsiD cases. 
given that the ttip, EU-vietnam Fta and Ceta could be grouped as the 
initial attempt to incorporate the EU’s new investment approach, subsequently 
reproduced in the forthcoming agreements, the analysis of the main institu-
tional features of the iCs will be reviewed in light of these three.
3.2.1. The First Instance Tribunal
The configuration of a judicial-alike structure is one of the most remarkable 
differences between the isDs and the iCs. In this sense, while the traditional 
isDs allows the parties to appoint the arbitrators on an ad hoc basis, the iCs 
provides for a panel of permanent members, transferring the right to appoint 
the adjudicators to the respondent States prior to the existence of a dispute.78
Regarding the Tribunal’s composition, for ttip, the proposed iCs would 
establish a Tribunal of First Instance composed of fifteen judges,79 appointed 
for terms of six years, renewable once.80 In the case of the EU-vietnam Fta, it 
provides for nine members of the Tribunal by equal participation, three being 
vietnam nationals, three nationals of EU Member States, and the other three 
are third-country nationals.81 In regard to Ceta, it stipulates a total of fifteen 
members of the Tribunal with a similar even distribution, five Canadian 
members, five members from EU Member States, and the remaining five 
represented by nationals of third countries,82 for a renewable five-year term. 
In terms of nomenclature, it is interesting that only the ttip proposal uses 
the term ‘judges’, whereas Ceta and the EU-vietnam Fta limit the reference 
to members of the Tribunal.83
Furthermore, the selection of the respective national members is delegated 
to special committees created under the agreements. Accordingly, the EU-
vietnam establishes the Trade Committee, composed of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry of vietnam and the EU Trade Commissioner, and similarly, Ceta 
creates the Joint Committee,84 integrated by the Minister for International 
78  The Shortcomings of the Proposal for an “International Court System” (ics). eFila 
Blog, 2017. Available at: https://efilablog.org/2016/02/02/the-shortcomings-of-the-proposal-
for-an-international-court-system-ics/ (Accessed 16 July 2017).
79  Article 9 (2), ttip (EU’s Proposal).
80  Article 9 (5), ttip (EU’s Proposal).
81  Article 12 (2), EU-vietnam Fta.
82  Article 8.27 (2), Ceta.
83  lenk. An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Investment 
Agreements, cit., 669.
84  Article 12, para. 2, respective Article 13, para. 2, EU-vietnam Fta; Article 8.27, para. 
2, respective Article 8.28, para. 7, let. f), Ceta.
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Trade of Canada and the EU Trade Commissioner. In both cases, the appoint-
ment must be reached by mutual consent.85
Moreover, individual cases shall be decided by divisions of three members 
of the Tribunal with the third-country national presiding over.86 Although 
this arrangement might appear similar to the traditional isDs, its uniqueness 
feature derives from the case-allocation mechanism commonly found in 
domestic judicial systems: “the three Members of the Tribunal are to be ap-
pointed by the President of the Tribunal on a yet-to-be specified ‘random and 
unpredictable’ rotation system”.87 This setting, based on a rotation scheme 
rather than nationality, is intended to tackle the lack of impartiality as it pre-
vents the contesting parties from having influence in the composition of the 
panel. For instance, in the case of the EU-vietnam Fta, the members of the 
Tribunal hearing the case are not required to have vietnamese nationality.88 
In a similar fashion, Ceta follows this pattern of rotation when appointing 
individual cases.89 
Furthermore, in order to ensure a disposition to perform their role, members 
of the Tribunal are paid a retainer fee on a monthly basis by the contracting 
parties.90 This way, the ttip sets an approximate of €2,000 retainer fee per 
month,91 whereas in the EU-vietnam Fta and Ceta is yet to be determined by 
their respective special committees.92
3.2.2. The Appellate Tribunal 
The iCs establishes a two-level judicial structure, which means that awards 
rendered in the first instance can be appealed to the Appellate Tribunal. 
In this way, by introducing an appellate mechanism, specialists expect to 
“prevent the inconsistencies in decision-making and avoid the haphazard 
domestic frameworks that currently come into play in investment arbitration 
practice”, and also “bring about more cohesion and more legal certainty to 
this body of law”.93
85  Ceta, Article 26.3, para. 3; the EU-vietnam Fta refers to decision making by “mutual 
agreement”, Article X.5, para. 3, Chapter on Institutional, general and Final Provisions.
86  Article 12, para. 8, EU-vietnam Fta; Article 8.27, para. 8, Ceta.
87  reinisCh. Will the EU’s Proposal concerning an Investment Court System for ceta and 
ttip lead to Enforceable Awards?, cit., 764.
88  Footnote 25 and 26, EU-vietnam Fta.
89  Footnote 9, Ceta.
90  Article 8.27.12 and 8.27.13, Ceta.
91  Article 9, para. 12, ttip (EU’s Proposal).
92  Article 12, para. 14, and Article 13, para. 14, EU-vietnam Fta; Article 8.27, para. 12, 
and Article 8.28, para. 7, let. d), Ceta.
93  BUtler. Possible Improvements to The Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 632.
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In regard to the composition of the Appellate Tribunal, the EU-vietnam 
Fta provides for six members, following the same tripartite distribution 
articulated for the First Instance Tribunal, this is: two EU nationals, two 
vietnam nationals and two third-country nationals.94 Ceta, on the other hand, 
does not specify the exact number of members to comprise the Appeal Tri-
bunal, but leaves this aspect to be determined by the Joint Committee under 
the condition of it being a division of three.95 As for the ttip proposal, the 
Appellate Tribunal would be composed of six members, also appointed by 
the contracting parties.96
In line with the First Instance Tribunal, the individual case assignation for 
appeals is determined on a rotational basis, and not on nationality. neverthe-
less, such reference is not expressly included in the provision governing the 
appointment of members of the Appeal Tribunal in Ceta.97 
noteworthy, the installation of an appeal facility allows the possibility 
to challenge an award within 90 days of its issuance.98 This increases the 
grounds for challenge and includes errors in the interpretation or application 
of the law as well as manifest error in the appreciation of the facts,99 thus 
guaranteeing correctness and predictability. Based on these grounds, the Ap-
peal Tribunal may either: reject the appeal, in which case the Tribunal award 
becomes final;100 or uphold the appeal, in which case it can modify – entirely 
or partially – the award101 or reverse the legal findings for the first instance 
to issue a revised award.102 
3.3. The venture towards a Multilateral Investment Court
Since the publication of the 2015 Trade Commissioner concept paper “In-
vestment in ttip and beyond – the path for reform”, the EU has exposed 
its ultimate objective of pursuing the establishment of a single multilateral 
permanent court applicable to multiple agreements and trading partners 
from all around the globe. In this sense, Commissioner Malmoström stated 
that “[t]he objective would be to multilateralize the court either as a self-
94  Article 13, para. 2, EU-vietnam Fta.
95  Article 8.28, para. 5, Ceta. 
96  Article 10 (2), ttip (EU’s Proposal).
97  Footnote 9, Ceta.
98  See Article 8.28(9)(a) revised text of Ceta, above n 3; Article 29(1), section 3, EU’s 
proposal, ibid; Article 28(1), section 3, EU–vietnam Fta Investment Chapter, above n 1.
99  Article 28, para. 1, EU-vietnam Fta; Article 8.28, para. 2, Ceta.
100  Article 29(2), section 3, EU’s proposal, ibid; Article 8.28(9)(c)(ii) revised text of Ceta, 
ibid; Article 29(2), section 3, EU–vietnam Fta Investment Chapter, ibid.
101  Article 29(2), section 3, ttip (EU’s Proposal); Article 8.28(2) revised text of Ceta, ibid; 
Article 28(3), section 3, EU–vietnam Fta Investment Chapter.
102  Article 28(7), section 3, EU’s proposal, ibid; Article 29(4), section 3, EU–vietnam Fta 
Investment Chapter, ibid; Article 8.28(7)(b) revised text of Ceta, ibid.
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standing international body or by embedding it into an existing multilateral 
organization”.103 
This proposal is feasible when considering EU’s goal of including the 
iCs in every future trade agreement, particularly by its inclusion in Ceta and 
potentially in ttip, which would cover a significant portion of the world’s 
source of FDi. Therefore, the introduction of iCs’s features in all EU trade 
and investment agreements would not only mark the departure from the 
traditional isDs but the opening wedge towards the consolidation of a single 
multilateral permanent court operating under a two-tier judicial structure to 
settle investment disputes.
In fact, experts tend to agree that “a single, preferably institution-ally-
managed and widely-accepted mechanism for reviewing investor-state ar-
bitral awards would be best suited to address the risk of fragmentation of 
the dispute settlement system that might otherwise ensue”.104 Therefore, the 
future of a multilateral permanent investment court seems to be a further step 
in achieving a more consistent and predictable case law and thus, enhancing 
the legitimacy of the investment regime. 
Interestingly, in Article 8.29 of Ceta, the EU and Canada confirmed their 
interest to pursue the establishment of a multilateral investment court in 
future agreements with other non-contracting trading parties. Similarly, Ar-
ticle 12 of the proposed ttip text contemplates the possibility of moving to a 
multilateral investment tribunal and/or a multilateral appellate mechanism, 
which if agreed, would subsume the relevant dispute settlement provisions.
4. CRITICISM To THE ICS
Despite the series of institutional and procedural innovations described above, 
the iCs is subject to censure from several scholars and sceptical practitioners. 
This chapter addresses some of the focal drawbacks foreseen by its detractors. 
4.1. Re-politicisation 
The iCs aims at tackling the problems associated with the lack of impartiality 
in the isDs by preventing parties from participating in the appointment of the 
panel hearing their case. However, some experts argue that such modification 
introduces a political component that may jeopardise the progress accomplished 
in terms of de-politicisation of investment disputes, considered one of the 
103  MalMströM. Concept Paper: Investment in ttip And Beyond – The Path for Reform, 
cit., 11.
104  Gleason, E. E. International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid Of? Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal. vol. 7, 2007, 286. Available at: http://digitalcommons.
pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss2/5 (Accessed 17 July 2017).
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greatest achievements of the system.105 In this way, the random composition 
of the Panel hearing the case not only removes the opportunity of disputing 
parties to appoint a neutral Tribunal but also unduly empowers a politically 
designated organ – the Joint Committee – to take over the selection process 
in disguise of impartiality. 
The risk of re-politicisation is further accentuated with the introduction 
of the appellate structure. In this sense, given the often-sensitive issues at 
stake “[t]here is concern that host state governments are likely to appeal every 
case lost at first instance, in order to gain favour with their constituents”.106 
It follows, therefore, that governments would be forced to appeal as a result 
of the pressure from their citizens and to their political agenda. Likewise, 
investors would follow the tendency to appeal adverse decisions due to similar 
pressures from their shareholders107. 
In response to the above, supporters of the iCs have come up with the idea 
of demanding securities in the form of a deposit or bond in order to access the 
appeal facility, which in turn may play a twofold purpose: on the one hand, it 
would disincentivise the erratic appellant; on the other hand, it would offer 
a reinforced guarantee of compliance with the final award.108 
Furthermore, some critics point out the paradox of transferring the right 
of appointment exclusively to sovereign States, which – through the prism 
of the State-appointed Joint Committee – would be ultimately selecting pro-
States oriented members of the permanent tribunal. In this sense, one may 
ask: “[i]f the concern was that private business lawyers serving as arbitrators 
have a natural bias towards enterprises, could government-appointed judges 
not also be suspected of having a natural bias towards the state, in particular 
their own?”.109 In this context, although the iCs would certainly rebalance the 
equation, it may improperly favour the interest of the host States rather than 
finding the sought point of equilibrium between the parties. 
4.2. quality of the decision-making
Some critics assert the lack of financial incentives to attract high-profile 
individuals comprising the permanent tribunal. In this sense, they fear that, 
similar to the experience with the introduction of the Wto Appellate Body, 
States may be reluctant to allocate sufficient financial resources for permanent 
105  lenk. An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Investment 
Agreements, cit., 669.
106  BUtler. Possible Improvements to The Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 635.
107  koeth. Can the Investment Court System (ics) Save ttip and ceta, cit., 12.
108  BUtler. Possible Improvements to The Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 636.
109  koeth. Can the Investment Court System (ics) Save ttip and ceta, cit., 12.
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members, and thus “[r]ather than attracting the most qualified experts, posi-
tions [would be] more likely to be filled by political appointees.110 Hence, by 
not having the best possible panel of arbitrators, the decision-making process 
may reduce in quality, efficiency and reliability. 
Moreover, there is no conclusive evidence to support the assertion that 
government-appointed members of the permanent tribunal would exercise 
a more competent, objective and impartial duty than those appointed by the 
parties in the current isDs.111 In fact, to this date, it is indisputable that the 
quality of the arbitrators and awards under the isDs has been extraordinarily 
high as a general rule.
A further concern related to the introduction of an appellate body is that 
it may undermine the authority of the first instance decision. In such manner, 
given the expected proclivity to appeal against the decisions of first instance, 
the latter are likely to be devalued.112 Consequently, high-profile arbitrators 
would be reserved for the appellate body, jeopardising a highly technical and 
efficient mechanism for dispute settlement. 
Additionally, the fact that the panel hearing the case would be selected 
randomly from a pool of permanent members of the tribunals, would elimi-
nate the opportunity of the parties to appoint experts in the precise – and 
often complex, interdisciplinary and highly technical – matter of dispute 
between the parties. 
4.3. Finality, efficiency and costs
Another source of criticism to the iCs derives from the alleged negative impact 
it would have on the finality of the awards, which in turn is perceived as one 
the main benefits of the isDs. In this sense, experts fear that the introduction 
of an instance of appeal would enhance the restricted grounds currently in 
place to challenge investment awards.113 
nonetheless, supporters of the iCs have argued that given the public policy 
issues often at stake in investment arbitration, it is necessary to reinforce the 
correctness of faulty decisions even if this might, in turn, sacrifice the finality 
of the awards.114 In other words, correctness should not be subordinated to 
finality, particularly when public interests are at stake. 
Furthermore, critics to the iCs assert that the parties’ right to appeal would 
negatively impact the delivery of efficient decisions, generating a domino 
110  Ibid., 12.
111  Ibid., 13.
112  taMs. Is there a Need for an icsid Appellate Structure?, cit., 229.
113  BUtler. Possible Improvements to The Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 634.
114  Ibid., 635.
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effect by lengthening the process and increasing significantly the costs of 
the proceedings. 
Concerning the time-frame, those opposing the iCs stress that an appel-
late structure would naturally extend the period of time before a definitive 
decision is reached. Logically, adjudication in a two-tiered system would 
take longer than in a single round of proceedings. Although this elongation 
of the proceedings would certainly depend on the time-frames to be estab-
lished on a case-by-case basis, it seems natural to assert that regardless of the 
configuration of the appeal body, its introduction would hinder the efficient 
resolution of disputes.115 
In contrast with the above, supporters of the iCs have claimed that the 
current rules regarding annulment proceedings within iCsiD framework and 
the review-mechanism through national courts in non-iCsiD awards, already 
causes considerable delays in the proceedings. Consequently, an appellate 
body would in fact contribute to accelerating the process by adopting strict 
time-limits.116
In regard to the alleged increase in costs, “based on a simple calculation: the 
longer the proceedings, the higher the costs”.117 This is particularly reflected 
in the additional attorney’s fees, which in fact constitutes the greatest expense 
in the arbitration process.118 Consequently, it may only benefit governments, 
large corporations and wealthy individuals with a strong financial muscle to 
finance the team of legal experts. 
Conversely, advocates of the iCs have argued that the new process would 
be cheaper compared to the current costs incurred in annulment proceed-
ings or challenges before national courts of the seat of arbitration or place 
of enforcement.119 
Finally, detractors of the iCs foreshadow an increase in cases being chal-
lenged by the losing party, which would affect the reliability of the system. 
In response to this, as previously discussed, defenders of the iCs call for the 
adoption of measures to discourage appeals and to guarantee the compliance 
of awards.120
115  taMs. Is there a Need for an icsid Appellate Structure?, cit., 228.
116  BUtler. Possible Improvements to The Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 635.
117  taMs. Is there a Need for an icsid Appellate Structure?, cit., 228.
118  lairD, I. and askeW, R. Finality versus Consistency: Does Investor State Arbitration 
Need an Appellate System? The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. vol. 7, 2005, 298.
119  BUtler. Possible Improvements to The Framework of International Investment Arbitra-
tion, cit., 635.
120  Ibid., 635.
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4.4. Enforceability
Some experts and practitioners have questioned the potential recognition 
and enforceability of the decisions rendered under the iCs, arguing a lack of 
compatibility with iCsiD and UnCitral procedures.121 This is due to the con-
figuration of the iCs as a judicial structure rather than an arbitral institution, 
which make some consider that neither the washington Convention nor the 
new York Convention would be applicable to it.122
Furthermore, while it is certainly debatable whether a ‘semi-permanent 
arbitration body’ would be considered to be a court or an arbitral tribunal, it 
is also true that, in the realm of international arbitration, mixed structures do 
exist, and the new York Convention has recognised that these are capable 
of rendering enforceable awards. The most notorious example of this is the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, established in 1981, which provided 
for the appointment of judges by the United States and Iran to settle cases 
between their nationals.123 To date, the Tribunal has finalised more than 3,900 
cases124 and is currently active.
In regard to the iCsiD framework, amendment of the Convention might 
turn awards of iCs tribunals into genuine iCsiD awards providing the full ap-
plicability of the Convention’s enforcement provisions. Alternatively, any 
potential modification of the iCs – provided it is compatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention – would lead to the substitution of the isDs as 
the mechanism to resolve investment-related disputes but this would be only 
applicable to the contracting parties of the respective investment agreement. 
It follows, therefore, that third States parties to iCsiD would not be affected 
by such modification and, consequently, would not have enforcement ob-
ligations unless the EU and its trading partners include specific provisions 
for the recognition and enforcement of investment agreements with them.125
In relation to the new York Convention, the critical issue would be “whether 
national courts in new York Convention contracting States, where recognition 
and enforcement may be sought in the future, [would] consider iCs awards as 
awards made by an arbitral body”.126 In this sense, as referred above, although 
it seems likely that the iCs would remain a form of mixed arbitration, and thus 
render enforceable awards under the new York Convention, operators may 
121  Collins. The UK should include Investor State Dispute Settlement (isds) in its Post-
Brexit International Investment Agreements, cit., 15.
122  lenk. An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Investment 
Agreements, cit., 670.
123  reinisCh. Will the EU’s Proposal concerning an Investment Court System for ceta and 
ttip lead to Enforceable Awards?, cit., 767.
124  See official website: http://www.iusct.net/ Accessed 31 March 2018.
125  Ibid., 782.
126  Ibid., 786.
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bear in mind that some national courts may reach the opposite conclusion, 
at risk of jeopardising the enforceability of the decisions.127 
ConCLUSIonS
In an ever more globalised world and economic marketplace, the advent of 
the investor-state-dispute settlement has reinforced the rule of law by offer-
ing foreign investors a legal-route to shield their investments against host 
States’ measures and omissions that may fail to meet international standards 
of treatment. In exchange, it has allowed States to promote a more attractive 
investment environment to invite foreign direct investment, and thus, foster 
economic growth.
In spite of its notable benefits as a means of international dispute settle-
ment, including efficiency, flexibility, finality and a comprehensive enforce-
ment structure, the current isDs is far from ideal. In a broad sense, it could be 
said that its structural deficiencies are the result of attempting to reproduce a 
dispute settlement model conceived for the resolution of private commercial 
disputes, rather than it being tailored for disputes involving public policy 
and public law matters. Accordingly, far-reaching reforms in the pursuit for 
consistency, impartiality and transparency are required in order to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the system.
nevertheless, it ought to be acknowledged that over the past few years the 
isDs has undergone a series of reforms that have already counteracted most 
of the concerns that the introduction of the iCs is intended to remedy. As a 
result, criticisms to the isDs must take into account the latest developments 
from arbitral houses, international practice guidelines and a new generation 
of investment treaties that have contributed to a remodelled isDs. 
For instance, the first version of Ceta, which originally adopted isDs as 
the mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes, was considered a 
state-of-the-art investment agreement, providing for, inter alia, express excep-
tions confirming the right of the State regulatory powers on the grounds of 
public health, public order, morality and the environment, thus tackling some 
of the issues associated with the alleged pro-investor affinity of the system.
Additionally, arbitral institutions and rules have predominantly followed 
a wide-reaching pro-transparency campaign in investment arbitration, which 
has led to recent amendments to iCsiD and UnCitral procedural rules, includ-
ing the implementation of public hearings and, as a general rule, making 
publicly available the communications from the Tribunal, the submissions 
of the parties and the rendering of the awards. 
Furthermore, although arbitral tribunals cannot be said to be bound by 
previous decisions, there is no doubt that landmark awards are regarded by 
127  Ibid.
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arbitrators as persuasive authority. Therefore, in response to critics concerned 
with the lack of consistency, a de facto doctrine of precedent is already in 
place in the isDs, which is encouraged by the public accessibility to the awards 
and the well-established practice of referring to the legal reasoning of other 
tribunals – both by counsel and arbitrators – in order to reinforce a given 
legal point and support the tribunal’s decision. 
Although improvements to the isDs model are still required in order to 
effectively meet the prospect of a more consistent, impartial and transparent 
means of dispute settlement, these reforms could take place within the isDs 
framework, instead of abandoning it entirely. Moreover, by continuing the 
path of reforms to the current isDs, together with the implementation of all 
possible safeguards against potential abuse of the investment regime, disput-
ing parties may be able to maintain an effective, flexible, final and easily 
enforceable means of dispute settlement that has been subject to international 
scrutiny, while continuing to improve its legitimacy and consistency.
In contrast, although the introduction of the iCs virtually addresses the isDs’s 
deficiencies, it may also bring more uncertainty to the system, while opening 
the door to other structural difficulties such as the risk of re-politicisation of 
the system, the potential decrease in quality of the decisions, the ambiguous 
consequences to the finality, efficiency and costs of the proceedings, and 
the threat to the enforceable structure in place for arbitral awards. Besides, 
it should be noted that some of the acclaimed innovations, such as the code 
of conduct for members of the tribunal, will be only implemented after the 
establishment of the Court, which means it needs underlying monitoring 
and review.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the introduction of the iCs has raised 
tensions within the EU concerning the compatibility of the iCs with the prin-
ciple of autonomy of the EU legal order, which will be ultimately decided 
by the CJeU. Following the Achmea case, this will be another controversial 
decision that will certainly shape the future of the EU’s investment policy 
and the subsequent implementation of a multilateral investment court system 
of global scale.
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